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In his 2013 New Year's speech, the mayor of Lhokseumawe, Aceh, Suaidi Yahya, 
announced that his administration would enact a bylaw (peraturan daerah, or Perda) that 
prohibited women from straddling motorcycles as pillion passengers. The bylaw 
would require that women sit sideways on motorbikes unless they were driving. 
According to Yahya, the bylaw would prevent females from spreading their legs in 
public. Male drivers would thereby not be "provoked," and women would be 
protected "from undesirable conditions."1 According to Yusuf A. Samad, a member of 
Lhokseumawe Legislative Council, straddling a motorbike accentuates a woman's 
curves, and "showing the curves of a woman's body is against Sharia."2
While this proposed bylaw drew praise from Indonesia's conservative Council of 
Islamic Scholars (Majelis Ulama Indonesia),3 it heightened concerns about the 
increasing numbers of laws enacted by local governments throughout Indonesia that 
appear to violate human rights provided by Indonesia's Constitution and national 
statutes.4 In 2010, the National Human Rights Commission (Komisi Nasional Hak 
Asasi Manusia, Komnas HAM) identified approximately 3,200 Perda as breaching the
1 Fitri Bintang Timur, "To Straddle or Not to Straddle, That Is the Question," Jnknrtn Post, January 7, 2013.
2 Bagus BT Saragih and Hotli Simanjuntak, "Aceh City to Ban Women from Straddling Motorbikes," 
Jnknrtn Post, January 3, 2013; Lynda Ibrahim, "Urban Chat: Straddle On, Strong Sisters," Jakarta Post, 
January 4, 2013.
3 "MUI Supports Aceh Bylaw Banning Females from Straddling Motorcycles," Jakarta Globe, January 8, 2013.
41945 Constitution, Chapter XA; Law No 39 of 1999 on Human Rights.
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human rights of minorities, particularly the freedom from discrimination.5 The Human 
Rights Research and Development Body of the Law and Human Rights Ministry found 
that most local government laws lacked a "human rights perspective" and that only 
around 5 percent of bylaws aimed to assist ordinary citizens (masyarakat kecil).6
Komnas Perempuan (the National Commission on Violence against Women) has 
recently identified 282 bylaws that, either in their terms or their application, 
discriminated against women as of August 2012, up from 207 in 2011, 189 in 2010, and 
154 in 2009.7 According to Komnas Perempuan, around one hundred of these bylaws 
concerned prostitution and pornography, sixty imposed dress codes and religious 
standards, and thirty-eight restricted women's mobility. These bylaws were issued by 
local governments in hundreds of regencies across twenty-eight of Indonesia's thirty- 
four provinces. In Aceh, some of these bylaws were enforced through imposition of 
draconian sanctions, including "punching, being bathed with sewage water, public 
parading, destruction of property, [and] evictions."8
Some of these discriminatory bylaws seek to impose Islamic values and are, 
therefore, often labeled by the media and commentators as Perda Syariah.9 Most of them 
appear to fall into one of two categories.10 In the first category are laws that, while 
consistent with Islamic teachings, concern activities or behaviors nonetheless regulated 
in most societies, whether religious or secular. In this category are public order laws 
regulating alcohol,11 gambling,12 and prostitution.13 In the second category are laws 
more obviously and uniquely Islamic in inspiration. They include laws promoting
5 "3200 Perda Bertentangan Dengan HAM," Media Indonesia, July 7, 2010.
6 "Hanya Lima Persen Perda Berperspektif HAM," Hukumonline, January 11, 2008.
7 Ina Parlina and Margareth Aritonang, "After Straddling Proposal, Ministry to Review Bylaws," Jakarta 
Post, January 18, 2013.
8 "An Uphill Battle to End Discriminatory Laws," Jakarta Post, September 17, 2012.
9 Robin Bush, "Regional 'Sharia' Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?" in Indonesia: Islamic Life 
and Politics, ed. Greg Fealy and Sally White (Canberra: Indonesia Update Series, 2008); Arskal Salim, 
Challenging the Secular State: The lslamization o f Law in Modern Indonesia (Honolulu, HI: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2008); Arskal Salim and Azyumardi Azra, Shari'a and Politics in Modern Indonesia (Singapore: 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003).
10 Arskal Salim, "Muslim Politics in Indonesia's Democratisation: The Religious Majority and the Rights of 
Minorities in the Post-New Order Era," in Indonesia: Democracy and the Promise o f Good Governance, ed. Ross 
H. McLeod and Andrew J. MacIntyre, Indonesia Update Series (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2007); Melissa Crouch, Indonesia, Militant Islam, and Ahmadiyah: Origins and Implications 
(Melbourne: ARC Federation Fellowship Centre of Islamic Law and Society, Melbourne Law School, 
University of Melbourne, 2009); Nicholas Parsons and Marcus Mietzner, "Sharia By-laws in Indonesia: A 
Legal and Political Analysis," Australian Journal o f Asian Law 11,2 (2010): 190. Note, however, that the 
categories we use here differ from the categories used in other scholarly works. Arskal Salim, for instance, 
groups such Perda into three categories: public order, religious skills and duties, and religious symbolism. 
Melissa Crouch recognizes nine categories: clothing, prostitution, social problems, alcohol and drugs, 
religious obligations, zakat management, Qur'anic education, the implementation of syariah, and non- 
Islamic religious regulations. However, some of these categories—"social problems" and "alcohol and 
drugs," for instance, and "religious obligations," "zakat management," and "implementation of syariah"— 
appear to overlap. For the purpose of determining whether these bylaws are within a regional 
government's jurisdiction, we distinguish between those that can only be justified on religious grounds 
and those that have a broader (secular) justification.
11 For example, Perda of Banjarmasin City No. 6 of 2007.
12 For example, Perda of Sambas City No. 4 of 2004.
13 For example, Perda of Tangerang City No. 8 of 2005.
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Quranic literacy;14 prohibiting eating in public during Ramadan;15 imposing Islamic 
dress codes,16 including upon non-Muslim women;17 and regulating Islamic charitable 
donations (zakat).18 A third category, which are Islam-related but do not seek to 
establish Islamic norms, are those that discriminate against, or even ban, followers of 
Ahmaddiyah, an oft-persecuted minority Muslim sect.19
Among the criticisms of Perda Syariah is that they breach Indonesia's human rights 
obligations.20 The primary domestic source of these obligations is now Indonesia's Bill 
of Rights, inserted into the Constitution in 2000. This is a large catalogue of rights, 
drawn from the main international human rights treaties, including the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Social and Economic Rights (ICSER), all of 
which Indonesia has ratified.21 Proponents of Perda Syariah counter that such laws are a 
legitimate expression of the democratic will of regional communities and a natural 
consequence of regional autonomy in majority Muslim areas. In this article, we do not 
seek to examine whether these Perda do, in fact, breach human rights standards, as 
critics claim. Indeed, our primary concern is not on the propriety or otherwise of Perda 
Syariah. Rather, we use the example of Perda Syariah—perhaps the most notorious 
category of what the media have termed "problematic" Perda22—to highlight some of 
the legal and political issues that arise from local lawmaking. The main purpose of this 
article is to examine the primary mechanism by which citizens can challenge the 
legality of all types of Perda—judicial review by the Supreme Court (Mahkamah 
Agung) of Indonesia—and highlight its many legal and practical deficiencies. The 
result of these deficiencies is that even bylaws that authorize local governments to 
perpetrate the most egregious breaches of human rights are likely to escape real 
judicial scrutiny and invalidation. Put simply, the Supreme Court cannot always be 
relied upon to enforce those or any other rights. This significantly endangers 
Indonesia's ability to uphold the rights provided in the Indonesian Constitution and 
domestic laws, and by international treaties it has ratified.
14 For example, Perdu of South Pesisir District No. 8 of 2004.
15 For example, Perdu of Banjarmasin City No. 13 of 2003.
16 For example, Perdu of Lima Puluh District No. 5 of 2003.
17 Yuli Tri Suwarni, "Tasikmalaya to Make Muslim Women Wear Headscarves," Jakarta Post, June 5, 2012.
18 For example, Perdu of Parepare City No. 1 of 2007.
19 For an extensive list of the bylaws relating to Ahmaddiyah, see Melissa Crouch, "Judicial Review and 
Religious Freedom: The Case of Indonesian Ahmadis," Sydney Law Review 34,3 (2012): 545; Crouch, 
Indonesia, Militant Islam, and Ahmadiyah.
20 Ahmad Suaedy, Religiously Nuanced Local Regulations and the Future o f Indonesian Democracy: An Outline 
(Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2008); Siti Musdah Mulia, "Peminggiran Perempuan Dalam Perda Syariat," 
Tashwirul Afkar 20 (2007); Parsons and Mietzner, "Sharia By-laws in Indonesia"; Melissa Crouch, "Regional 
Regulations in Indonesia: Failing Vulnerable Groups," Review o f Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 43,2 (2009); 
Bush, "Regional 'Sharia' Regulations in Indonesia"; Subair Umam, "Pluralisme, Politik, Dan Gerakan 
Formalisasi Agama: Catatan Kritis Atas Formalisasi Agama Di Maros Dan Pangkep," in Politisasi Agama 
Dan Konflik Komunul, ed. Ahmad Suaedy (Jakarta: Wahid Institute, 2007).
21 Laws 11 of 2005 (ICESCR) and 12 of 2005 (ICCPR).
22 See, for example, "ICW: 84 Hakim Tipikor Dinilai Bermasalah," Hukumonline, August 29, 2012; "Hingga 
Akhir 2008, 34 Perda Bermasalah," Kompas, December 31, 2008; "Perda Bermasalah," Koran Jakarta, August 
12, 2010; "Perda Bermasalah Lambat Ditangani," Seputar Indonesia, July 13, 2010.
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Politics and Law
The analytical framework employed in this article is primarily legal. Yet 
conventional wisdom has long held that Indonesian law as it appears "on paper" is 
quite different from its "practice"—that is, its operation or implementation, 
particularly by the courts. A large body of literature, produced by both political 
scientists and legal scholars, has convincingly demonstrated that law "in practice" is 
dictated almost exclusively by non-legal factors—predominantly politics, corruption, 
and "legal culture."23 The result is that the law "on paper" is often either ignored or 
misapplied in favor of the highest bidder (in cases involving at least one non-state 
actor, whether an individual or legal entity) or the state (in cases involving the 
government and even individual officials). This explanation of law as "power" 
(whether political or financial) was largely developed from analyses of the operation of 
the legal system as it existed before the fall of Suharto in 1998, primarily based on 
studies of disputes between private parties (such as commercial matters) and between 
the citizen and state (such as criminal and administrative law cases).
We argue that, while this explanation certainly remains broadly applicable in 
modern Indonesia—particularly given the continuing, perhaps even increasing, 
influence of corruption in many types of cases—it no longer appears accurately to 
describe the operation of the legal system in all cases. In some types of cases, 
corruption appears unlikely to be in play, and the law seems able to constrain the 
exercise of political power, at least to some degree.
The types of cases in which law is becoming more relevant are, broadly speaking, 
disputes between the various institutions of government about their relative 
jurisdictions. Some of these disputes have played out in Indonesia's Constitutional 
Court, about which much has been written.24 This article takes a different line of 
enquiry, examining the jurisdictional disputes between central and regional 
governments that have been decided by the Indonesian Supreme Court. These disputes 
have emerged with increasing regularity since regional autonomy was introduced 
posthaste after the end of the New Order.
They are, in our view, essentially "new" disputes. In them, the Indonesian state, 
represented by the central government and a regional government, is, in essence, 
fighting itself. This is true even in cases brought before the Supreme Court by citizens 
affected by what they consider to be an undesirable Perda. Although, as mentioned 
below, they must be affected by the Perda to have standing to bring a claim before the 
Supreme Court, the concrete circumstances in which they find themselves are 
irrelevant to the Court's enquiry. Even in these judicial review cases, the court's task is 
to determine whether a national law trumps a local law. Not surprisingly, Indonesian
23 Daniel S. Lev, "Judicial Institutions and Legal Culture in Indonesia," in Culture and Politics in Indonesia, 
ed. Claire Holt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972); Daniel S. Lev, "Judicial Authority and the 
Struggle for an Indonesian Rechtsstaat," Law and Society Review 13 (1978): 37-71; Sebastiaan Pompe, The 
Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study o f  Institutional Collapse (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program 
Publications, 2005); Adriaan Bedner, Administrative Courts in Indonesia: A Socio-Legal Study (The Hague and 
Boston, MA: Kluwer Law International, 2001); Tim Lindsey, ed., Indonesia: Law and Society, 2nd ed. 
(Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2008).
24 Simon Butt, "Indonesia's Constitutional Court—The Conservative Activist or Pragmatic Strategist?" in 
The Judicialization o f Politics in Asia, ed. Bjorn Dressel (Oxfordshire, and New York, NY: Routledge, 2012).
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government institutions, including the national and regional governments, have had 
serious rivalries and disagreements throughout Indonesia's modern history. During 
the Suharto period, at least, these were largely resolved by the might of the central 
government, backed, of course, by military force or the threat thereof and reinforced by 
an integrality ideology.25 26However, since Suharto's fall, the political and legal power 
previously held in the presidency has been effectively dispersed among a range of 
institutions, including parliaments, courts, and local administrations.25 The Indonesian 
"state" is, therefore, no longer synonymous with the Indonesian presidency, or even 
the national government.
These new types of disputes are also taking place in a very different context 
compared to that in which the "law in practice" and "law as power" explanations were 
developed. Significantly, under the so-called satu atap (one roof) reforms, the Supreme 
Court has since been made institutionally independent of the "state"—that is, national 
government departments—and is said to have been exercising that independence.27 
Even if the Court were inclined to side with the "government," it is now unclear which 
institution or tier of government it would side with. As we demonstrate below, in 
decentralized Indonesia there is genuine disagreement about where real political 
power lies on the spectrum between the central and regional governments, at least in 
respect of particular issues that Perda can regulate. One might presume that because 
the Supreme Court is a national institution, it will naturally side with the central 
government. However, this presumption is not clearly borne out in the cases, 
discussed below, in which regional governments have defeated the central government 
in disputes brought before that Court.
Also important in shaping this new context is the increased transparency of the 
Supreme Court's decision-making and the publicity these types of cases have attracted. 
Never before have these disputes played themselves out so publicly in Indonesian 
courtrooms and been so intensely dissected by the media. Rarely had the decisions 
themselves been made publicly available, complete with the legal arguments 
employed by the disputing governments. Many of them are now available on the 
Supreme Court website.
To be sure, politics are still influential, but the influence appears to have lessened in 
the post-Suharto period. We argue that, with the increase in judicial independence and 
greater transparency, the "space" for law has widened in these cases. However, as we 
shall see, the increasing space for and resort to law has highlighted the significant 
shortcomings of the law itself. In particular, the rules for delineating the powers and 
responsibilities of these institutions and for helping resolve disagreements between 
them are unclear and largely unworkable.
25 Adrian Buyung Nasution, Demokrasi Konstitusional: Pikirtm & Gagasan (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 
2010).
26 Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, The Indonesian Constitution: A Contextual Analysis (Oxford: Hart, 2012).
27 Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, "Unfinished Business: Law Reform, Governance, and the Courts in Post- 
Soeharto Indonesia," in Indonesia, Mam, and Democratic Consolidation, ed. Mirjam Kunkler and Alfred 
Stepan (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013).
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Structure
We have divided our coverage into four parts. In Part I, we discuss, by way of 
background, regional governments in Indonesia and the reforms under which they 
were granted power to enact these bylaws. We also briefly describe the other available 
mechanism for the review of bylaws—"bureaucratic review." Under this process, the 
central government examines bylaws and can invalidate them in some circumstances. 
We then turn to discuss various political and legal issues at play in these disputes. In 
Part II, we discuss the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review bylaws, as laid down in 
the Constitution and national statutes, demonstrating that, at least formally, its 
jurisdiction is limited. As we shall see, peculiarities of the Indonesian system preclude 
bylaws being reviewed for compliance with the Constitution, including its Bill of 
Rights.
Part III examines how the Indonesian Supreme Court has exercised its jurisdiction, 
through an examination of all forty-six decisions available on the Supreme Court's 
website in mid-2013 in which the Court reviewed bylaws. These cases fall into two 
categories. In the first, the Court is asked by a citizen to review the validity of a local 
law; in the second, a local government asks the Court to challenge the invalidation of a 
Perda by the central government under the bureaucratic review process we discuss in 
Part I. In Part IV, we conclude by suggesting ways the Supreme Court could improve 
its procedures and decision-making in judicial review cases with a view to it becoming 
a forum in which fundamental domestic and international human rights principles can 
be reliably upheld. We consider legal arguments that might be used to support the 
expansion of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction without amending the Indonesian 
Constitution. Other options—creating an independent body to assess local laws, or 
handing over jurisdiction to review Perda to the Constitutional Court—are, we argue, 
legally feasible but undesirable and, in any event, unlikely to be realized in the 
foreseeable future.
Part I: Regional Autonomy and Bureaucratic Review
Regional Autonomy
When former President Suharto stepped down in May 1998, Indonesia launched an 
ambitious program of decentralization. Resentment of Suharto's strongly centralized, 
predatory, and corrupt state was so strong that many feared Indonesia would 
"Balkanize" without implementing genuine regional autonomy. Indonesia's national 
government responded quickly. In 1999, statutes were enacted that required 
preparations for decentralization to commence by 2001.
One of the priorities of Indonesia's constitutional reforms of 1999-2002 was to 
entrench the powers of regional governments. Article 18 of the Constitution was 
amended to grant regional governments in Indonesia's provinces (propinsi), districts 
(kabupaten), and cities (kota) "the widest possible autonomy," with the central 
government retaining exclusive jurisdiction over only some areas (Article 18(5)). To 
this end, local governments were granted lawmaking powers. Democratically elected 
parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, or DPRD) at each level of regional 
government—provincial, city, and district—received legislative powers (Article 18(6)
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of the Constitution) to enact regional legislation (Perda). Democratically elected 
"regional heads" (kepala daerah)—in provinces, these are governors (gubernur), in 
districts regents (bupati), and in cities mayors (zvalikota)—also obtained power to issue 
their own laws, primarily to implement legislation enacted by their respective 
parliaments. The laws produced by these local officials are referred to as regional head 
regulations (peraturan kepala daerah, or perkada). For convenience, in this article we refer 
generically to both regional legislation and regional head regulations as "bylaws."
At time of writing, Indonesia had 34 provinces, 399 districts, and 98 cities, each 
with their own legislatures and executive governments, and more than 70,000 
villages.28 29All of these tiers of local government have their own lawmaking individuals 
and institutions. Although precise numbers appear to be unavailable, these lawmakers 
have produced many thousands of bylaws,24 only a small proportion of which appear 
on the websites of regional governments and the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA).30
The primary statute in which Article 18 of the Constitution is fleshed out is Law No. 
32 of 2004 on Regional Governance ("the 2004 Regional Governance Law"). Article 10(3) 
of this Law reserves for the central government exclusive jurisdiction over foreign 
affairs, defense, internal security, the justice sector, national monetary and fiscal policy, 
and religion. However, even outside these areas the lawmaking powers of regional 
governments are not exclusive. Article 10(5) of the 2004 Regional Governance Law 
gives the central government power to enact laws about matters that fall beyond those 
reserved exclusively for it. In essence, then, most tiers of Indonesian government have 
overlapping jurisdiction, except for those areas reserved for the central government. 
Legally speaking, the central government can, therefore, continue to regulate any 
matter over which regional governments also have jurisdiction. In other words, the 
central government is, legally, able to block virtually any regional government law by 
passing its own higher-level law. However, as we shall see in Part II, jurisdictional 
overlaps are difficult to resolve within the Indonesian legal system.
Bureaucratic Review
Indonesia's regional autonomy laws provide for significant oversight by national 
institutions. One oversight mechanism is bureaucratic review. We provide only a brief 
outline of this complex process here, given that our focus is judicial review.31
The 2004 Regional Governance Law provides two grounds for review of all types 
of regional laws: noncompliance with the public interest or higher-level laws.
28 We have taken these figures from the Ministry of Home Affairs website, www.depdagri.go.id/, accessed 
February 5, 2014.
29 "Ribuan Perda TimbulkanMasalah Bagi Pengusaha," Hukumonline, June 23, 2011.
30 http:/ / www.jdih.setjen.kemendagri.go.id/, accessed February 5,2014.
31 The review procedures are set out in the 2004 Regional Governance Law (which outlines mechanisms 
for executive review), Government Regulation No. 79 of 2005 on the Guide to the Supervision of Regional 
Governance, and MOHA Regulation No. 53 of 2011 on Local Law-making (which provide more details on 
the review process), and Law No. 28 of 2009 on Regional Taxes and User Charges (which deals specifically 
with review of laws imposing taxes and user charges). On regional taxes, see Simon Butt and Nicholas 
Parsons, "Reining in Regional Governments? Local Taxes and Investment in Decentralised Indonesia," 
Sydney Law Review 34,1 (2012): 91-106.
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"Inconsistent with the public interest" is vaguely described in the 2004 Regional 
Governance Law as "policies that disturb harmonious relations between members of 
society, public services, and public order and [that are] discriminative."32 We discuss 
the "higher-level" ground below in Part III.
As for the review process itself, Perda on regional budgets, taxes, user charges 
(retribusi), and spatial planning must be sent to and approved by the central 
government before enactment and can be reviewed again after enactment.33 Bylaws 
concerning other matters are subject to post-enactment review only. They must be 
submitted to the central government for assessment within seven days of enactment.34 
If they are deemed to violate the public interest or a higher-level law, they are to be 
invalidated by Presidential Regulation within sixty days of receipt of the Perda for 
review.35 Regional governments then have seven days to cease implementation of the 
Perda and formally repeal it.36 If no Presidential Regulation is issued within the sixty- 
day time limit, the Perda continues in force by default.37 Regional head regulations are 
reviewed by a similar process, except they can be invalidated by the MOHA rather 
than the president.38
Between 2002 and 2009, the MOHA annulled 1,878 bylaws, and in 2009-12 it 
cancelled 951 of 15,000 bylaws.39 The Home Affairs Minister predicted that his ministry 
would review more than 2,500 bylaws, both old and new, in 2013.40 However, with few 
exceptions, only Perda that raise revenue for local governments have been targeted for 
review and invalidation.41 Presumably, this focus helps guard central government 
revenue flows. Laws with other subject matter appear to have escaped review 
altogether for several reasons. One is that some local governments have refused to 
send their bylaws to the central government for review,42 often as a deliberate strategy
32 Elucidation to Article 136(4).
33 These are to be sent by governors to the Central Government and by mayors and district heads to 
provincial governments within three days of their passage through parliament but prior to enactment: 
MOHA Regulation No. 53 of 2011 Articles 61, 66. Regional governments are to be notified of the outcome 
of the review within fifteen days, after which the regional government has seven days to make any 
necessary amendments: MOHA Regulation No. 53 of 2011 Articles 65(1), (2), 70(1), (2).
34 MOHA Regulation No. 53 of 2011 Articles 73, 75(1), (2).
35 2004 Regional Governance Law Article 145(2), (3).
36 2004 Regional Governance Law Article 145(4).
37 2004 Regional Governance Law Article 145(7).
38 MOHA Regulation No. 53 of 2011 Article 75(3).
39 Parlina and Aritonang, "After Straddling Proposal, Ministry to Review Bylaws."
40 Ibid.
41 Simon Butt, "Regional Autonomy and the Proliferation of Perda in Indonesia: An Assessment of 
Bureaucratic and Judicial Review Mechanisms," Sydney Law Review 32,2 (2010): 177. For example, in 
January 2013, a MOHA spokesperson revealed that of the 1,878 bylaws invalidated by the Home Affairs 
Ministry, almost 1,800 of them concerned regional taxes and levies. The remaining twenty-nine dealt with 
third-party political donations, and twenty-two pertained to alcoholic beverage regulation. Of the 750 
Perda under review at time of writing, 589 concerned regional taxes and levies, 19 concerned alcoholic 
beverages, and 71 concerned third-party political donations. See Parlina and Aritonang, "After Straddling 
Proposal, Ministry to Review Bylaws."
42 Pandmn praktis memahami perancangan peraturan daerah (Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal Peraturan 
Perundang-undangan Departemen Hukum dan HAM bekerjasama dengan United National Development 
Programme; CAPPLER Project, 2008); "Banyak Perda Abaikan Kaidah Yang Berlaku," Hukumonline,
March 16, 2012.
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to avoid revocation. This is often successful because there appear to be no formal 
sanctions for failure to submit many types of Perda to the central government.43 
Another reason is that MOHA lacks resources to review the large number of regional 
laws it receives. Our research revealed that reviews are conducted by relatively small 
MOHA teams that meet only weekly and cannot allocate sufficient time to the task.44 
Most post-enactment reviews are, therefore, not completed within the sixty-day time 
limit imposed by Law No. 32 of 2004. As mentioned, after sixty days, the Perda 
therefore comes into force automatically without review.45 The result, we suspect, is 
that many bylaws that contradict national statutes and regulations—including those 
national laws that impose human rights standards, such as the Constitution—remain 
on the books.
While focus on revenue-raising Perda might be politically motivated, it is supported 
and facilitated by the legal framework. Notably, unlike other Perda, revenue-raising 
Perda are subject to both pre- and post-enactment review. Moreover, prior to the 
enactment of Law 28 of 2009 on Regional Taxes and User Charges, there were no time 
limitations for review of revenue-raising Perda, and they could be revoked by the 
MOHA rather than the president if local governments issued them without adhering to 
the central government's directions during pre-enactment review.46 This made the 
process for reviewing Perda that imposed taxes and user charges much easier than for 
other types of Perda. While Law 28 of 2009 introduced a mechanism and time limit for 
revenue-raising Perda to be reviewed and annulled post-enactment by the president, it 
did not explicitly repeal the MOHA's power to revoke at any time revenue-raising 
Perda that did not adhere to central government direction during pre-enactment review. 
Whether this MOHA power was implicitly repealed or not has not yet arisen for 
decision by the Supreme Court, as the MOHA has not, to our knowledge, formally 
revoked any revenue-raising Perda since Law No. 28 of 2009 took effect.
The Politics of Bureaucratic Review
Despite the very significant problems with bureaucratic review that we have 
outlined, the central government appears to be under very little pressure to reform the 
process. In 1999, when Indonesia's framework for regional autonomy was being 
devised, there were undoubtedly good policy reasons for the national government to 
supervise regional governments. For the thirty-three years of Suharto's reign, regional 
governments had, for the most part, done little more than implement national 
government policy in the regions. Most had no experience in making policy or law.
43 Interview with Janurudin from Department of Home Affairs, conducted by M. Nur Sholikin and Siti 
Maryam Rodja, January 19, 2011. By contrast, the central government can impose financial penalties upon 
regional governments that fail to submit their tax and user charge bylaws for review within the time 
specified (Law No. 28 of 2009 Art 159(1)).
44 See also David Ray, "Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate," in Decentralization, 
Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate (Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth, 2003), p. 18.
45 We note that any ministry unit—in Indonesia or beyond—would likely find meeting the law's tight time 
frames difficult, given the complexity of the task, the required knowledge of areas of national law with 
which bylaws must comply, the need to coordinate with other ministries and experts, and the vast 
numbers of regional laws submitted for assessment.
46 2004 Regional Governance Law Articles 185(5), 186(5), 189.
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As time passes and local lawmakers become more experienced, however, debate 
intensifies about whether bylaws should be reviewable by the central government, or 
by any body other than the local lawmaker itself. Different opinions stem from the 
variety of views held in Indonesia about what decentralization means and how it 
should work. We have identified two main strains of opinion emerging out of the field 
research conducted for this paper, including interviews and a roundtable with officials 
from the Home Affairs Ministry, the Law and Human Rights Ministry, the National 
Development Planning Agency (BAPPENAS, Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Nasional), local governments, and the Supreme Court, as well as parliamentarians, 
non-government organizations, and academics.4
The first group—which we call the "protectionists"—primarily comprises civil- 
society organizations, community groups, citizens, and reformists, but also some 
central government officials. The thrust of this strain is that Indonesian citizens need 
protection from local governments, some of which are incompetent, predatory, or both. 
For protectionists, existing executive and even the judicial review mechanisms 
(discussed below) are woefully inadequate and must, therefore, be overhauled or 
replaced. The central government—despite facing similar criticisms and its own 
challenges—has more human and financial resources at its disposal and thus should be 
responsible for providing that protection.
Protectionists point out that many of these bylaws, including the so-called Perda 
Syariah, appear to threaten universal human rights that are also provided for under 
Indonesia's Constitution and other domestic laws.47 8 However, local laws have certainly 
been criticized not only for their potential to breach human rights. Important public 
services, environmental protection, natural resources, international obligations, and 
Indonesia's legal order are all at stake.49 Although there are undoubtedly exceptions, 
many bylaws have been criticized for being unworkably unclear, meeting no apparent 
regulatory need, and for not being preceded by any public consultation.50 A common 
complaint is that many bylaws seek to do little more than exact over-exploitative taxes 
and user charges (retribusi), for which the receiving local government provides few
47 Fieldwork for this research was funded by AusAID. In January 2011, interviews were conducted with 
various government officials, including from the Supreme Court, MOHA, the finance ministry, and local 
parliamentarians. Interviews were also held with academics, practitioners, and non-government 
organizations. In March 2011, a roundtable discussion on Perdu review mechanisms organized as part of 
this research was attended by a number of participants from government institutions involved in the 
review of Perda. These included the MOHA Legal Bureau, Perdu Drafting Facilitation Director of the 
Department of Law and Human Rights, Law Analysis Directorate of BAPPENAS, the national women's 
commission, Committee Supervising the Implementation of Regional Autonomy (Komite Pemantauan 
Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah), Association of Indonesian City Governments, and the National Legal Aid 
Institute of Jakarta (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Jakarta).
48 See also "Under the Syariah Umbrella," Tempo, September 6, 2011; "Perda Bermasalah, Buah Otonomi 
Kebablasan," Hukumonline, October 27, 2007; Nurun Nisa, Gamal Ferdhi, and Nurul Huda, "Bersama 
Menolak Perda Diskriminatif," Nnzvala: The Wahid Institute, June 2007; "Hanya Lima Persen Perda 
Berperspektif HAM"; and "3200 Perda Bertentangan Dengan HAM."
49 Butt, "Regional Autonomy and the Proliferation of Perda in Indonesia"; Christopher M. Barr and Center 
for International Forestry Research, Decentralization o f Forest Administration in Indonesia: Implications for 
Forest Sustainability, Economic Development, and Community Fivelihoods (Sindang Barang, Bogor: Center for 
International Forestry Research, 2006).
50 See also Ray, "Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and the Business Climate."
Judicial Review and the Supreme Court 65
benefits or services, if any.51 For example, the Indonesian Chamber of Industry (Kamar 
Dagang dan Industri Indonesia, KADIN) commonly complains that, quite apart from 
their excessive cost and number, many of these taxes appear to duplicate other taxes 
issued by another tier of government, leading to confusion as to which of them are 
legally payable. The result is said to be a "high cost economy" that damages 
Indonesia's investment climate.52
The second group—the "autonomists"—primarily comprises local governments, 
although it also encompasses many members of the national executive, legislature, and 
judiciary interviewed as part of this research. Autonomists tend to emphasize that the 
genuine intent of decentralization was, in fact, to hand over significant power and 
responsibility to local governments.53 For them, decentralization is about giving real 
autonomy to local governments and, presuming that local elections are free and fair, 
leaving it to citizens to remove non-performing local governments. According to 
autonomists, how local governments exercise their autonomy is, for better or for worse, 
a matter for them and their constituents to decide unless it intrudes upon legitimate 
central government interests. If bylaws are to be reviewed at all, then, they should be 
reviewed by an independent body, such as a court, not by the national government. 
Autonomists commonly appeal to democratic principles to justify their position, 
arguing that because local legislators are elected, they should be able to enact any law 
that they wish. However, the main weakness of this position is that the very laws 
granting power to local governments to enact Perda in the first place do not give them 
carte blanche. The first regional autonomy statute, enacted in 1999, made this clear, 
delineating the relative jurisdiction of the various tiers of government, as have 
subsequent laws, including the Constitution, as mentioned above. In other words, 
there are "rules of the game," even though, as we shall see, both their content and 
operation are not always clear.
51 According to one estimate, for the first six years of decentralization, local governments established 
around one thousand new taxes and user charges (retribusi) per year. See Blane D. Lewis and Bambang 
Suharnoko Sjahir, "Local Tax Effects on the Business Climate," in Rural Investment Climate in Indonesia, ed. 
Neil McCulloch (Singapore: SEAS, 2009), pp. 224—245, esp. 224, 231.
52 See also Pratikno, "Exercising Freedom: Local Autonomy and Democracy in Indonesia, 1999-2001," in 
Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia, ed. Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, Maribeth Erb, and Caroline Faucher 
(New York, NY: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), p. 21; Ilyas Saad, "Implementasi Otonomi Daerah Sudah 
Mengarah Pada Penciptaan Distorsi Dan High Cost Economy," in Decentralization, Regulatory Reform, and 
the Business Climate (Jakarta: Partnership for Economic Growth, 2003); Bambang Brodjonegoro, "Three 
Years of Fiscal Decentralization in Indonesia: Its Impacts on Regional Economic Development and Fiscal 
Sustainability," paper presented at the Fiscal Decentralization in Asia Revisited conference, Hitotsubashi 
University, 2004; UNDP, "Enhancing Communications, Advocacy and Public Participation Capacity for 
Legal Reforms (CAPPLER) PHASE II" (United Nations Development Programme, 2008); Agus Maryono, 
"Thousands of Bylaws Halt Investment: BKPM," Jakarta Post, October 23, 2009; "Indonesia Failing to Cash 
in on Mineral Surge: Analysts," Antara, November 12, 2007; and OECD, OECD Investment Policy Reviews 
(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010), p. 21.
53 See also Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Change and Democracy in Indonesia (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013); and Harold Crouch, Political Reform in Indonesia after Soeharto 
(Singapore: ISEAS, 2010).
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Part II: The Review Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
In practical terms, there are two avenues by which the validity of a Perda can be 
challenged before the Supreme Court. The first is the 2004 Regional Governance Law, 
under which regional governments whose bylaws have been revoked by the central 
government can challenge such revocations.54 In this category of cases, the Supreme 
Court will usually review the lawfulness of the revoked bylaw in order to determine 
whether it was validly revoked. In some cases, the issue before the Court will be 
whether the central government adhered to the lawful procedures in revoking the 
bylaw. In most cases, however, the main issue for the Court will be whether the 
revoked bylaw was, in fact, contrary to a higher law or the public interest as claimed 
by the central government.
The second channel is its broader general judicial review power.55 This power 
allows the Court to "check" both whether the substance of a law is valid (the so-called 
hak uji materiil) and whether all relevant procedures for the enactment of the law were 
adhered to (hak uji formil).56 Though the Supreme Court Law gives the Court power to 
review both aspects, the Supreme Court itself has only established procedures for 
hearing the first type—“hak uji materiil"—and, as a result, the Court has not yet heard 
any cases of the second type.
Applications for judicial review (hak uji materiil) can be made directly to the 
Supreme Court, or via the applicant's local district court (pengadilan negeri).57 To have 
legal standing, an applicant must show that his or her rights or interests have been 
adversely affected by the enactment of the legal instrument.58 Applicants may be 
individual Indonesian citizens, customary community groups (kesatuan masyarakat 
hukum adat), as well as public or private legal entities.59 This avenue of review, 
therefore, is available to local governments, businesses, and citizens alike. Laws struck 
down by the Supreme Court will no longer be legally binding.60 These Supreme Court 
decisions are not subject to appeal.61
54 Article 145(5) of Law No 32 of 2004 provides that regional governments can challenge in the Supreme 
Court the post-enactment revocation by Presidential Regulation of their Perda. Government Regulation No. 
79 of 2005 Article 41 provides that regional governments can challenge in the Supreme Court the post­
enactment revocation by MOHA Regulations or Governor's Regulations of their tax or user charge Perda.
55 Whether the first avenue of review stands alone or is a subcategory of the Supreme Court's general 
judicial review power has provoked some academic disagreement, but has not yet, to our knowledge, 
attracted judicial consideration: "Berangkat Dari Pembatalan Perda Privatisasi Rumah Sakit: Problem 
Hukum Pengujian Perda (1)," Hukumonline, June 22, 2006.
56 Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court Article 31(2). This is confirmed both in Law No. 4 of 2004 on 
the Judiciary Article 11 (2)(b) and Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court Article 31(1).
57 Law No. 4 of 2004 on Judicial Power Article 11(3); Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court Article 
31(3).
58 Law No. 14 of 1985 Article 31A(2).
59 Ibid.
60 Law No. 14 of 1985 Article 31(4).
61 Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2011 on Material Review Article 9.
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The "Rules of the Game": The Hierarchy of Laws
As for the higher-level law ground for invalidity, the starting place is Indonesia's 
"hierarchy of laws," contained in Article 7(1) of Law No. 12 of 2011 on Law-Making 
("the Lawmaking Law"), which is as follows:
The Constitution;
MPR62 Decisions;
Statutes/Interim Emergency Laws;
Government Regulations;
Presidential Regulations;
Provincial Per da; and
District and city Per da.
The hierarchy lists various types of laws in descending order of their legal 
authority vis-a-vis the other types of laws on the list. For example, a government 
regulation must not contradict a statute enacted by Indonesia's parliament or the 
Constitution, which occupies prime position on the hierarchy. However, a government 
regulation will prevail over a presidential regulation in the event of any inconsistency.
At the bottom of the list, Perda issued by provincial, city, and district governments 
are in a weak position vis-a-vis the other laws on the hierarchy: when enacted, those 
bylaws must not contradict those higher-level national laws, and after enactment, those 
bylaws are susceptible to repeal by higher-level national laws. District and city Perda 
are particularly weak given that they must contradict neither those higher-level 
national laws nor provincial Perda.63 64
At first glance, the hierarchy might appear to provide order to the Indonesian legal 
system by clearly delineating the authority of various types of laws and the institutions 
that make them. Thus, if a Perda contradicts a statute, that Perda will be formally 
invalid to the extent of any inconsistency. Pointing to the hierarchy, some scholars 
have argued that Perda Syariah are invalid because they deal with religion—a matter 
exclusively reserved for the central government by statute/4 a law higher than Perda in 
the hierarchy.
However, the hierarchy is incomplete, and its practical application is often highly 
problematic. Article 8 of the Lawmaking Law provides that types of laws outside the 
hierarchy have legal effect insofar as their enactment is pursuant to a law listed on the 
hierarchy. It states:
(I) Types of laws other than those referred to in Article 7(1) include regulations 
stipulated by the People's Consultative Assembly, the People's 
Representative Council, the Regional Representative Council, the Supreme 
Court, the Constitutional Court, the National Audit Agency, the Judicial
62 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, the People's Consultative Assembly.
63 Law No. 12 of 2011 Article 7(2).
64 2004 Regional Governance Law Article 10(3).
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Commission, Bank Indonesia, Ministers, or equivalent agencies, institutions 
or commissions established by statute or by the government as required by 
statute, Provincial People's Representative Councils, Governors, 
County/City People's Representative Councils, the Mayor/County Heads, 
Village Heads or equivalent.
(2) The types of laws referred to in Article 8(1) are recognized and have 
binding legal force to the extent that they are required by higher level laws 
or on the basis of authority.
In practice, Article 8 significantly undermines the order that the hierarchy purports 
to bring to the legal system. Many types of laws very frequently employed in 
Indonesia are not mentioned on the list contained in Article 7(1), so even though they 
are given legal force by virtue of Article 8(2), their authority vis-a-vis other laws is 
therefore unclear.
Take, for example, a statute that authorizes the central Bank of Indonesia to issue 
regulations on monetary policy, and the Finance Minister to regulate the finance sector. 
If these regulations conflict with each other and a regional tax Perda, which of the three 
regulations takes precedence over the other two? As for the Bank of Indonesia 
Regulation and the Finance Minister Regulation, they are both authorized by the same 
statute, and the hierarchy provides no mechanisms to resolve the inconsistency 
between them.
The status of Perda vis-a-vis Ministerial Regulations and Decisions is a highly vexed 
question. On the one hand, some argue that ministerial regulations should be treated 
as sitting between presidential regulations and provincial regulations because 
ministers are senior national officials appointed by the president. The National Legal 
Development Agency (Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional, BPHN) supports this view, 
pointing to Article 17 of the Constitution, which provides that ministers are to help the 
president administer government on a national scale.65The Agency concludes:
The scope of a Ministerial Regulation's force is national, meaning it takes effect 
throughout the whole of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia's 
territory ... [I]t can be concluded that Ministerial Regulations are above Perda: a 
Perda's effect is limited to its respective region, whereas a Ministerial 
Regulation's effect is national. Because a Ministerial Regulation is higher than a 
Perda, a Perda cannot be inconsistent with a Ministerial Regulation.66
In our view, the agency's arguments are unconvincing. Its interpretation 
uncritically equates broader geographic force with a status "higher" on the hierarchy. 
The Constitution recognizes the role in government of both ministers and regional 
governments. Both are given law-making powers by statute, and the laws of both 
should be presumed to have full effect within their respective areas of jurisdiction, 
unless provided otherwise by law. National statutes commonly delegate power to 
ministers to issue regulations and decisions, and to local governments to issue Perda. If
65 Noor M. Aziz, Laporan Akhir Pengkajian Hukum Tentang Eksistensi Peraturan Perundang-Undangan Di Luar 
Hierarki Berdasarkan UU No. 10 Tahun 2004 Tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan (Jakarta: 
Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional Departemen Kehakiman, 2010), pp. 51-55.
66 Ibid, at p. 54.
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these instruments are both issued in response to a statutory delegation of power, why 
should one trump the other? It might, indeed, be desirable for ministers to be given the 
power to override Perda, but this needs to be expressly stipulated in the Constitution or 
in statute. Since the Constitution recognizes the "widest possible" autonomy, regional 
governments and their citizens have a legitimate expectation of autonomy, and any 
decision to limit that autonomy (by, for instance, giving ministers the power to trump 
Perda) should be taken by parliament.
In 2001, the Justice and Human Rights Minister issued a Circular Letter that sought 
to resolve this ambiguity.67 The Circular declared that Ministerial Regulations sit below 
Presidential Regulations and above Perda on the hierarchy.68 However, somewhat 
ironically, Circular Letters themselves have a notoriously ambiguous legal status and 
certainly cannot "override" or add to the hierarchy outlined in the Lawmaking Law. 
Moreover, if, contrary to the minister's view, Perda in fact do trump Ministerial 
Regulations, the minister would not have the power to elevate the authority of his own 
regulations by issuing a Circular or any other instrument.
With a view to removing ambiguity, the National Legal Development Agency 
recommended that the Lawmaking Law be amended as follows:
Regulations issued by state institutions that are established by the Constitution, 
such as the Finance Auditing Agency, Bank Indonesia, General Election 
Commission, Supreme Court, Constitutional Court, and the Judicial 
Commission, should be expressly mentioned on the hierarchy and positioned 
alongside Presidential Regulations;
Ministerial Regulations should be placed on the hierarchy below Presidential 
Regulations and above Provincial Perda;
Governor Regulations should be placed on the hierarchy below Provincial Perda 
and above District and City Perda; and
Mayor and District Head Regulations should be placed on the hierarchy below 
city and district Perda.69
However, the national parliament appeared to ignore these recommendations 
when it revised the hierarchy of laws in 2011, which, as demonstrated above, does not 
mention most of these laws.
Adding to the confusion arising from the hierarchy is the unclear status of a lower- 
level law after the higher-level law upon which it relies for its authority is amended, 
repealed, or replaced. For example, when a statute is replaced, the new statute 
customarily stipulates a time within which new subordinate legislation, or regulations, 
must be enacted. These time frames are, however, routinely flouted in Indonesia. To 
avoid a legal vacuum, new statutes typically provide that lower-level laws made under 
the old statute remain in force "to the extent [that they are] not inconsistent with" the 
new statute. Thus, to determine whether a lower-level law issued under a replaced or
67 Circular Letter dated February 23, 2001, cited in Maria Farida Indrati, limit Penmdang-undangan: Jenis, 
Fungsi, dim materi Muatan (Yogyakarta: Kanisius, 2007), p. 94.
65 Ibid.
69 Aziz, Lnpornn Akhir Pengkajian Hukum, p. 73.
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amended statute remains formally valid, governments, business, and citizens alike 
must often engage in the imprecise task of assessing whether that lower law is 
consistent with the current statute. However, the Indonesian Supreme Court has, as 
discussed below, provided little guidance on how to assess whether laws are consistent 
or if they conflict.
Ultimately, however, the confusion arising from the hierarchy is moot if the 
hierarchy itself is unenforceable. Unfortunately, most types of laws on the hierarchy 
appear not to be enforceable or reviewable as against many of the others. This is 
because, as Indonesian law currently stands, there are wide gaps in the Supreme 
Court's general judicial review jurisdiction, as we discuss in Part III. (Even though this 
is currently a significant impediment, in Part IV we suggest legal avenues by which it 
might be overcome.) Additionally, as discussed, the Indonesian Supreme Court 
appears to shrink from even those conflicts that it has power to review.
Part III: Supreme Court's Exercise of Its Judicial Review Powers
For Indonesia's Supreme Court, exercising judicial review powers is a relatively 
new endeavor. Even though the Court has had the formal power to review lower-level 
laws from the early 1970s, "the Court all but refused to exercise it until after Suharto's 
resignation in 1998. 1 In addition, the judicial review powers that the Court did possess 
were strictly circumscribed: even if the Court had found a law to be invalid, it lacked 
formal authority to strike down that law. Only the government official or institution 
that issued the law could do this.72Thus, the Court's powers of review were merely 
"declaratory."73 Moreover, the Court could only consider the validity of a law if the 
issue arose on cassation (appeal). 4 Both this formal limitation of the Supreme Court's 
powers and the Court's reluctance to exercise those powers were consistent with and 
exacerbated by the general judicial subservience to government during Suharto's reign. 
As mentioned in the introduction, during this period the courts were heavily 
dependent on government, which was largely able to dictate to judges the decisions it 
wished them to reach.70 12345
However, in 2004, administrative control over the judiciary was transferred to the 
Supreme Court under the so-called satu atap (one roof) reforms. The Court's judicial 
review power was strengthened to provide that laws declared invalid by the Court do 
not have legal effect76 and to allow challenges to the validity of a law to be made
70 Law No. 14 of 1970 on Judicial Power Article 26(1).
71 In the 1960s, however, the Supreme Court formally decided not to apply several provisions of the Civil 
Code that were deemed contrary to the 1945 Constitution. See Supreme Court Circular Letter No. 3 of 1963, 
September 5,1963; Daniel Lev, "The Lady and the Banyan Tree: Civil-law Change in Indonesia," The 
American journal o f  Comparative Law 14,2 (1965): 282-83; Sudargo Gautama and Robert Hornick, An 
Introduction to Indonesian Law: Unity in Diversity, rev. ed. (Bandung: Alumni Press, 1983), p. 185; and
Z Ansori Ahmad, Sejarah Dan Kedudukan BW Di Indonesia. (Jakarta: Rajawali, 1986).
72 Law No. 14 of 1970 on Judicial Power Article 26(3); Law No. 14 of 1985 Article 31(4).
73 Muhammad Ridhwan Indra, Kedudukan lembaga-lembaga negara dan hak menguji menurut undang-undang 
dasar 1945 (Jakarta: Sinar Grafika, 1987), p. 142.
74 Law No. 14 of 1970 Article 26(2); Law No. 14 of 1985 Article 31(3).
75 Lev, "Judicial Authority and the Struggle for an Indonesian Rechtsstaat."
76 Law No. 14 of 1985 Article 31(2) as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004.
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directly to the Court, rather than only incidentally through an appeal. These reforms, 
combined with the new rules allowing applicants to bring judicial review cases directly 
to the Court, appear to have spurred the lodgment of a significant number of Supreme 
Court judicial review applications. According to Court statistics, it heard around two 
hundred judicial review cases in 2004-09,78 sixty-one cases in 2010,79 fifty in 2011, and 
fifty-six in 2012.8(1 In 2011, twelve of these were reviews of bylaws;7 8901 and in 2012, fifteen 
were such reviews.82
The Court also appears no longer to feel constrained by the government in the 
exercise of its judicial powers. As we shall see, the Court has been willing to strike 
down laws issued by the government and even the president, something it would not 
have done during Suharto's reign. In some cases,83 the Court has even appeared to 
adopt creative judicial reasoning to overcome significant legal obstacles in order to 
invalidate regional government regulations. However, as we demonstrate in the 
following sections, the exercise of the Supreme Court's judicial review powers remain 
problematic for other reasons, including an incomplete legal infrastructure for 
resolving disputes. The problem is exacerbated by lack of consistent, principled, and 
transparent judicial reasoning.
Overview of Cases Studied
As mentioned, we base our analysis upon an examination of the forty-six 
judgments in judicial review cases available on the Supreme Court's website. Twelve 
of these were challenges to regional legislative decisions (none of which was 
successful), six to laws issued by governors and district heads (three were successful), 
and thirteen were challenges brought by local governments against central government 
decisions to invalidate their legislation (two were successful). Sixteen were challenges 
to regional legislation. Of these, five were successful, of which two sought to establish 
fees for services (retribusi), two related to prohibitions on alcohol, and one related to 
the incorporation of hospitals.
The single most common reason the Court employed to reject an application was 
that it had been filed out of time. Until recently, the Supreme Court had, by Supreme 
Court Regulation,84 imposed upon applicants a 180-day time limit to lodge an 
application for judicial review of a law, running from the date that the law was
77 Law No 14 of 1985 Article 31(3) as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004.
78 Parsons and Mietzner, "Sharia By-laws in Indonesia," p. 198.
79 Mahkamah Agung, Laporan Tahunan 2010 (Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung, 2011), p. 75.
80 Mahkamah Agung, Laporan Tahunan 2012 (Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung, 2013).
81 Six were regional legislation, four were governor regulations, two were regent regulations, and one was 
a governor's decision: Mahkamah Agung, Laporan Tahunan 2Oil (Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung, 2012), p. 14.
82 Of these, ten were regional legislation, two were regent regulations, two were laws issued by governors, 
and one was a mayoral regulation: Mahkamah Agung, Laporan Tahunan 2012.
83 See, for example, the "Prohibition Perda" cases discussed below.
84 Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2004 Article 2(4) and before that in Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 
of 1999 Article 5(4).
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enacted.85 The 180-day time period has now been abolished by Supreme Court 
Regulation.86
The next most common reason for the Court to reject an application was that the 
instrument challenged was administrative in nature, not legislative, an issue to which 
we return below. Two applications were rejected on the ground that the applicants did 
not have legal standing.
Procedural Weaknesses
Like bureaucratic review, judicial review, as currently exercised by the Supreme 
Court, has many flaws. As we shall see, many of them reflect broader practices and 
procedures that the Supreme Court employs in other types of cases, and some of the 
systemic problems it faces. In Part IV we suggest how some of these shortcomings 
might be overcome.
Our research revealed several procedural shortcomings, three of which we discuss 
here. The first is lack of transparency in case management and administration. Once 
applicants have submitted their judicial review applications, they are given no 
information about the progress of their case. The Court often posts the outcome of its 
cases on the Supreme Court's website without notifying the applicant and before the 
applicant receives a copy of the judgment.87 Alarmingly, the Court has occasionally— 
including in the infamous Tangerang prostitution Per da case, discussed below— 
announced decisions by press release without making any written judgement available, 
even to the parties to the dispute.
In 2007, the Supreme Court Chief Justice issued a decree88 that required all courts, 
including itself, to provide public access to various court documents, including judicial 
decisions. To be sure, this is an onerous obligation, and the Court has, on the whole, 
performed it well: there were, in mid-2003, over 40,000 Supreme Court decisions 
publicly available on the Court's website, along with many thousands of decisions 
issued by other Indonesian courts. However, the number of decisions now available
85 Our research indicates that the Supreme Court had been inconsistent in the way it applied the 180-day 
time limit. For instance, to determine whether the application was brought "in time," the Court would 
someti mes use the date on the application, but in other cases would use the date the application was 
officially registered with the Supreme Court. The difference was often significant, particularly for 
applicants who lodged their challenge with the local district court (pengadilan negeri) and discovered that 
their applications were registered with the Supreme Court much later. The Court would, on occasion, 
allow "late" applications to be heard (e.g., Decision No. 20.P/HUM/2002), but rejected others with no 
explanation (e.g., Decision No. 05.G/HUM/2001). Most alarming, however, were cases in which the Court 
dismissed applications for being out of time even when they were, in fact, registered within 180 days of 
the enactment of the challenged law (e.g., Decision Nos. 08.P/HUM/2004 and 09.P/HUM/2004). Whether 
deliberate or in error, the Court's decisions are final and not subject to appeal.
86 No. 1 of 2011.
87 In some cases, the Court took several months to inform the applicant of the decision and to send the 
decision to the applicant: Simon Butt and Nicholas Parsons, "Analytical Paper: Perda Review 
Mechanisms," report prepared for AusAID, on file with authors, 2011. These time frames for making 
decisions are, in fact, not particularly bad by world standards, though, of course it is difficult to 
understand why informing the applicant of the decision and sending a copy takes so long.
88 144/KMA/VIII/2007.
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online constitutes only a fraction of the Court's decided cases—between them, the 
Supreme Court's fifty or so judges decide well over ten thousand cases per annum.89
The second procedural shortcoming relates to the way arguments are presented to 
and considered by the Court. Like many courts of final appeal in civil law countries,90 
the Indonesian Supreme Court usually does not provide an opportunity for the parties 
to present oral argument or to respond directly to the submissions of the other side. 
After the parties lodge their written submissions to the Court, the judges allocated to 
the case then meet to discuss the case and come to a decision.91 Virtually all Supreme 
Court cases—whether civil, criminal, or administrative—are decided using this process.
Third, the Court has adopted practices that allow a bylaw, no matter how 
egregiously it violates the rights of citizens, to be applied while the Court is deciding 
upon its validity. The Supreme Court takes, on average, around three years to decide 
each bylaw review case studied, with the shortest taking one month92 and the longest 
eight years.93 However, the Court does not issue interim or interlocutory injunctions in 
bylaw review—or any judicial review—cases. Suspending the application of the bylaw 
would prevent citizens from continuing to labor under an oppressive bylaw while the 
Supreme Court examines the parties' submissions.
Further, if found to be invalid, bylaws are held to be void from the date of the 
relevant Supreme Court decision, not ab initio (from the time of enactment). The refusal 
to issue injunctions and to invalidate ab initio significantly diminishes the utility for 
citizens of bringing a claim and, ultimately, undermines the authority of the Court.
Reviewability of Per da Revocations
The particular national legal instrument needed to revoke Perda has caused much 
confusion. Also unclear is whether revocation by another legal instrument will be 
effective. Prior to the 2004 Regional Governance Law's enactment, Perda were revoked 
by the MOHA on behalf of the central government.94 The 2004 Regional Governance 
Law changed this, identifying Presidential Regulations as the instrument to revoke
89 In 2007, the Court cleared 10,554 cases; in 2008, 9,351; in 2009,14,483; in 2010,14,662; in 2011,15,223, and 
in 2012,12,520: Mahkamah Agung, Laporan Tahurum 2012.
90 See, generally, John Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems o f Western 
Europe and Latin America. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1984).
91 Pedoman Pelaksanaan Tugas Dan Administrasi Pada Mahkamah Agung (Jakarta: Mahkamah Agung, 2006), 
pp. 131-33.
92 Supreme Court Decision No. 03.P/HUM/2009.
93 Supreme Court Decision No. 03.G/HUM/ 2000. In several of the cases in which the Court was asked to 
review regulations about district head elections, the Court issued its decisions after the term of the official 
elected under the disputed rules had already expired. See Supreme Court Decision Nos. 02.G/HUM/2000; 
03.G/HUM/2000; 04.P/HUM/2000; 05.P/HUM/2000; 04.P/HUM/2002; 19.P/HUM/2002;
15.P/ HUM/ 2003; 02.P/HUM/2004.
94 Law No. 22 of 1999 Art 114(1) stipulated simply that Perda were to be revoked by the central government. 
Government Regulation No. 20 of 2001 Article 10(1) specified that the MOHA was to issue these 
revocations in the name of the president. Article 10(2) of the same regulation gave governors as central 
government representatives the power to revoke city and district level bylaws. Article 17(2) of 
Government Regulation No. 66 of 2001 on User Charges gave the MOHA the same power with respect to 
Perda on user charges.
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Perda,95 except for revenue raising Per da requiring pre-enactment review.96 97Even so, 
almost all Perda revoked to date have been by MOHA Decision. Only one Perda has 
been invalidated by Presidential Regulation.M/ It is arguable, then, that the MOHA lacks 
statutory authority to revoke most Perda, and that, therefore, its decisions purporting 
to revoke Perda are themselves invalid.
Perversely, however, these MOHA Decisions may be immune from review— 
judicial or otherwise. As mentioned, the Supreme Court has special jurisdiction under 
Article 145(5) of the 2004 Regional Governance Law to review only the validity of 
Presidential Regulations that purport to revoke Perda, not MOHA Decisions. Further, it 
arguably has no power under its general review jurisdiction to review revocations by 
MOHA. Its general jurisdiction extends only to legal instruments that are "regulatory" 
(mengatur)—that is, which contain an abstract "legal norm" that binds the general 
public (mengikat umum).98 However, MOHA Decisions—or, indeed, any decision that 
revokes a regional law—are most likely properly characterized as administrative 
decisions (keputusan tata usaha negara), which are "individual, concrete, and final"99 
because they are, in effect, orders that specific Perda be revoked within a particular 
time frame. If the MOHA Decisions revoking Perda were to be characterized as 
administrative decisions, the Supreme Court could not review them using its general 
judicial review jurisdiction. Rather, the dispute would be about an administrative
95 Article 145(2) stipulates that the central government is to invalidate Perda on specified grounds, and 
Article 145(3) specifies that invalidations under Article 145(2) are to be by Presidential Regulation.
96 Under Articles 185(5) and 189 of the 2004 Regional Governance Law, the MOHA has power to revoke 
provincial Perda at any time if enacted without adhering to pre-enactment review procedures established 
under the law. Similarly, Articles 186(5) and 189 gave governors the power to revoke city and district level 
Perda for ignoring pre-enactment review procedures. These provisions might explain the high number of 
tax and user-charge Perda revoked by the MOHA. The enactment of Law No. 28 of 2009 on Regional Taxes 
and User Charges on September 15, 2009, adds further complexity. Law 28 of 2009, which deals 
specifically with the review of regional tax and user charge Perda, does not provide any scope for 
revocation by the MOHA. It instead stipulates that revocation is to be by Presidential Regulation based on 
a recommendation from the MOHA (Articles 158(4), (5)). As this statute deals specifically with the post­
enactment review of Perda that are required to have also undergone pre-enactment review, but does not 
provide any power to the MOHA to revoke Perda directly, this Law has arguably effectively repealed 
Articles 185,186m, and 189 of the 2004 Regional Governance Law to the extent they applied to regional tax 
or user-charge Perda. However, it appears that the MOHA does not share this view. MOHA Regulation No. 
53 of 2011 provides, in Articles 65(3) and 71(3), the same scope for MOHA to revoke Perda as under Law 
No. 32 of 2004. Art 70(3) provides the same power for provincial governors. This might be consistent with 
the view that Law No. 28 of 2009 did not intend to repeal implicitly those provisions of Law No. 32 of 2004. 
It might, however, simply be contrary to Law No. 28 of 2009 and, to that extent, formally invalid.
97 On October 18, 2006, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued Presidential Regulation No. 87 of 
2006 on the Invalidation of Articles 33(2) (n) and 34(8) of Aceh Qanun No. 7 of 2006 (the Second 
Amendment to Aceh Qanun No. 2 of 2004 on the election of governors/ deputy governors, bupati/deputy 
bupati, and mayors/ deputy mayors in the Province of Aceh). It was suggested during interviews 
conducted as part of this research that the president might be reluctant to exercise his review powers to 
invalidate Perda because, under Law No. 32 of 2004, Presidential Regulations can be subject to challenge in 
the Supreme Court. In other words, by issuing invalidations, the president makes himself vulnerable to 
having his regulations struck down in favor of local government laws. This, it was suggested, would 
damage his reputation. We have been unable to verify this claim.
98 See the Lawmaking Law Article 1(2); Supreme Court Regulation No. 1 of 2011 Article 1(2).
99 Article 1(9) of Law 51 of 2009 amending Law 5 of 1986 on the Administrative Courts.
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decision, which falls within the jurisdiction of the state administrative courts
(pengadilan tata usaha negara).100
The Supreme Court has been inconsistent in its decision making about whether 
MOHA Decisions revoking regional laws are "regulatory" or "administrative" and has 
not yet settled this and other fundamental jurisdictional questions, let alone openly 
discussed them in its judgments. This is unfortunate, because such inconsistency and 
indecision allows the Supreme Court to refuse to hear a judicial review application, 
sometimes unpredictably, without providing much explanation. On the one hand, in a 
2002 decision,101 the Court found that a MOHA Decision revoking a decree issued by a 
regional parliament was an administrative instrument and, therefore, fell beyond the 
Court's review jurisdiction.102 Faced with such a decision, a regional government could 
theoretically institute proceedings in the State Administrative Court to review the 
MOHA Decision in question. However, by the time the litigants receive the Supreme 
Court's decision, the ninety-day time limit to file a case in the State Administrative 
Court—which runs from the date of the issue of the administrative decision103—would 
likely have elapsed. On the other hand, in other cases, the Court has categorized these 
MOHA Decisions as legislative instruments and proceeded to review them.104 In yet 
another case,105 the Court held that the impugned MOHA Decision was invalid because 
only the president had the power to revoke such a Per da, not the MOHA.
Absence of Reasoning and Academic Doctrine
Generally speaking, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence and reasoning in judicial 
review cases is simplistic and superficial. Its judgments are often terse and provide 
little in the way of reasoning that future judges can develop as jurisprudence or that 
applicants can use to make arguments in subsequent cases. In many Perda review cases, 
the Court has not, in its judgments, discussed the substance of the relevant bylaw, the 
arguments of the parties, or even whether the bylaw contradicts any higher laws.106 In 
other words, the Court has been reluctant to consider the "merits" of the case.107 The 
Court has, in some cases, been content simply to declare that the Perda is regional in 
scope and within the jurisdiction of the relevant local government "on the basis of 
Regional Autonomy . . . " 108 It appears that this or a similar approach was taken in the 
infamous Tangerang Perda case, which concerned a bylaw that sought to ban 
prostitution. The Perda was used to arrest for suspected prostitution a pregnant
100 More specifically, provided that the law was not characterized as "legislative," the Supreme Court 
would refuse to review it. We note here that laws might be categorized as neither legislative nor 
administrative, in which case its review falls outside the Court's jurisdiction.
101 Supreme Court Decision No .02.G/HUM/ 2004.
102 Ibid, at 24.
103 State Administrative Court Law Article 55.
104 Supreme Court Decision Nos. 08.P/HUM/2004, 09.P/HUM/2004, 20.P/HUM/2007, 03.P/HUM/2009.
105 Supreme Court Decision No. 17.P/HUM/2005.
106 See, for example, Supreme Court Decision Nos. 03 G/HUM/2002, 06 P/HUM/2003, and 
06 P / HUM / 2006.
107 Butt, "Regional Autonomy and the Proliferation of Perda in Indonesia," p. 187.
108 Supreme Court Decision No. 03 G / HUM / 2002.
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waitress while she was waiting for a bus home one night. At a press conference, a 
Supreme Court spokesperson announced that the Court had decided that the Per da 
was formally valid because it had been enacted using proper parliamentary procedures 
and that the Perda's subject matter was within the jurisdiction of the Tangerang city 
government.109
Further, the Supreme Court appears to ignore selectively some of the time limits 
that the 2004 Regional Governance Law imposes on local governments that submit 
their Perda for pre-enactment review. For example, in one case involving a regional 
budget,110 the Court held, in essence, that it would not interfere with a budget enacted 
by a regional government simply because "[Regional governments] have the authority 
to regulate their budgets in accordance with conditions in their regions." The Court did 
not even mention the pre-approval requirements for budget Perda, let alone consider 
whether this Perda had met them.111 In another case,112 the Supreme Court upheld the 
validity of a MOHA Decision issued in 2007 that sought to revoke a Perda of the 
District of Nias enacted in 2002. Nias argued the 2004 Regional Governance Law only 
authorized the president to invalidate Perda, not the MOHA. Moreover, Nias pointed 
out that, even though it had submitted the Perda for review within fifteen days of its 
enactment, the MOHA Decision had breached the time limits within which it could 
legally revoke the Perda.113 14The Supreme Court did not address any of the arguments 
raised by Nias or even whether the Court had jurisdiction to review a MOHA Decision. 
Instead, it simply held that the Perda did, in fact, seek to impose a fee on an object of 
central government tax and, therefore, violated higher-level laws.
This lack of engagement with the parties' arguments and the substance of the 
relevant Perda, and the relative absence of court-led jurisprudence, is not an 
uncommon feature of the Court's decision making in other types of cases or of judicial 
decision making in some countries adhering to the civil law tradition."4 However, in 
civil law countries in the developed world, such as in continental Europe, this lack of 
explanatory reasoning is often compensated by a rich body of academic literature, 
referred to as "doctrine," or doktrin in the Indonesian context. This literature is often 
consulted by judges and influences their decisions, thereby giving leading academic 
works semi-authoritative status and prompting lawyers to rely heavily upon them 
when advising clients and presenting arguments. In short, leading civil law academic 
commentaries, including discussion and analysis of important decisions, provide some 
of the background and legal arguments that lawyers in common-law countries might
109 "MA Tolak Permohonan Uji Materiil Perda Pelacuran Tangerang," Hukumonline, April 16, 2007.
110 Supreme Court Decision No. 24 P/HUM/2002.
111 Butt, "Regional Autonomy and the Proliferation of Perda in Indonesia," p. 187.
112 Supreme Court Decision No. 20.P / HUM / 2007.
113 Article 25A(3) Law No. 18 of 1997 as amended by Law No. 34 of 2000 on Regional Taxes and User 
Charges and Government Regulation No. 66 of 2001 Article 17(3) gave the central government one month 
to respond; and Article 145(3) of the 2004 Regional Governance Law and Article 38(1) of Government 
Regulation No. 79 of 2005 allocate sixty days.
114 Mitchel Lasser, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis o f Judicial Transparency and Legitimacy 
(Oxford and New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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expect to be contained in judicial decisions themselves.115 16Yet in Indonesia doctrine is 
largely underdeveloped, primarily because legal academics are poorly paid and need 
additional work to make ends meet, leaving them little or no time for research and 
developing doctrine.115
We argue that there is a need for more academic discussion about judicial review 
that attempts to distill general principles and provides frameworks for judges to use 
when deciding cases. Only a handful of academic texts about judicial review in 
Indonesia are available,117 many of which are historical and descriptive rather than 
analytical. In particular, the two criteria for executive and judicial review of Perda— 
public interest and consistency with a higher level law—are desperately un- or under­
developed and demand scholarly attention. As for the public interest ground, we have 
found no significant judicial or academic discussion or debate about the concept, 
despite extensive searching. Public interest has rarely been invoked as a ground for 
invalidation of Perda, and, to our knowledge, has never been used as the sole ground 
for invalidation.118 This is surprising because the concept is vague and highly elastic, 
giving it significant potential for use (and abuse) whenever the MOHA or Supreme 
Court review Perda.
As for the higher-law ground, even though Indonesian lawyers often proclaim the 
hierarchy of laws as though it were self-explanatory, nothing could be further from the 
truth, as discussed above. In particular, the degree to which laws must overlap to be 
"inconsistent" is, to our knowledge, entirely ignored by most Indonesian 
commentators. Many unanswered questions remain. For example, are laws 
inconsistent simply if they cover the same subject matter as each other, even if they are 
quite different in their details? (Given the "Prohibition" Perda case study discussed 
below and various interviews conducted as part of this research, it appears that senior 
judges and government officials take the view that such laws would be inconsistent.) Is 
a Perda inconsistent with a higher-level law if it simply adds certain requirements or 
preconditions to that higher-level law? Or, rather, is this both expected and necessary 
when those higher-level laws are cast in very general terms, leaving detail to be fleshed 
out by local government representatives in recognition that they are best placed to "fit" 
rules to local conditions? In other jurisdictions, quite complex bodies of law and 
jurisprudence have been developed to help assess whether laws are, in fact, 
inconsistent.
115 Mitchel Lasser, Anticipating Three Models o f Judicial Control, Debate, and Legitimacy: The European Court o f 
Justice, the Com de Cassation, and the United States Supreme Court (New York, NY: New York University 
School of Law, 2003).
116 Gary Bell, "The Importance of Private Law Doctrine in Indonesia," in Indonesia: Law and Society, ed. Tim 
Lindsey, 2nd ed. (Annandale, NSW: Federation Press, 2008); Simon Butt, "Judicial Review in Indonesia: 
Between Civil Law and Accountability? A Study of Constitutional Court Decisions 2003-2005" (PhD 
dissertation, Law Faculty, Melbourne University, 2007).
117 See, for example, Zainal Hoesein, Judicial Review Di Mahkamah Agung RI: Tiga Dekade Pengujian Peraturan 
Perundang-Undangan (Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada, 2009); and Ni'matul Huda, Problematika Pembatalan 
Peraturan Daerah (Yogyakarta: FH UII Press, 2010).
118 Butt, "Regional Autonomy and the Proliferation of Perda in Indonesia."
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Case Study: "Prohibition" Perda
Our research uncovered only two judicial review decisions in which the Supreme 
Court declared invalid provisions of so-called "Perda Syariah" —regional laws inspired 
by Islamic norms. Neither of these Perda explicitly purported to introduce Islamic 
norms. Rather, they sought to prohibit the sale of alcohol. In the first case, the Perda 
challenged was Kuningan District Perda No. 29 of 2001 on the Prohibition and 
Regulation of Alcohol.119 In the second, Jambi City Perda No. 3 of 2008 on the 
Prohibition on the Sale and Distribution of Alcoholic Beverages was challenged.120 The 
applicants were small-scale restaurateurs and business owners who sold beverages 
containing between 1 and 5 percent alcohol. The applications in these two cases were 
very similar save for geographical references. This we attribute to both sets of 
applicants being represented by the same lawyer (Dr. E. Maman Suryaman).
In both cases, the applicants argued that the Perda conflicted with Presidential 
Decision No. 3 of 1997 on Monitoring and Controlling Alcoholic Beverages. Article 3(1) 
of this decision classified alcoholic beverages into three categories based on the 
concentration of alcohol in the drink. Beverages containing up to 5 percent alcohol fell 
into Category A, those with between 5 and 20 percent were in Category B, and 
beverages with between 20 and 55 percent, Category C. Article 3(2) provided that 
Category B and C beverages were "controlled goods" (dalam pengawasan), but did not 
mention Category A beverages. The applicants argued that because the decision did 
not stipulate that Category A beverages were controlled goods, the effect of the 
decision was to make the production, distribution, sale, and consumption of Category 
A beverages unrestricted.
The decision and reasoning of the Court in both cases were very similar, perhaps 
because one judge—Justice Prof. H. Ahmad Sukardja—served on the three-judge panel 
in both cases. The Court accepted the applicants' primary arguments, deciding, in 
effect, that these Perda could not restrict or prohibit the distribution or sale of drinks 
containing 5 percent or less of alcohol, because the Presidential Decision did not seek 
to impose these restrictions or prohibitions. In these two cases, the Supreme Court 
invalidated Article 3(2) of both impugned Perda, which sought to prohibit the 
distribution of these weaker alcoholic beverages. The Supreme Court also invalidated 
Article 4 of both Perda, which excluded hotels with ratings of three stars or more from 
the prohibition, allowing them—but not other hotels—to sell alcohol.
In these cases, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to strike down 
regulations that some Islamic groups appear to support strongly, unlike in the 
Tangerang prostitution Perda case mentioned above. This is, in our view, quite 
significant given that the Court could have legitimately thrown out these cases on 
some of the procedural grounds mentioned above. Notably, the applications for review 
were lodged "out of time"—that is, not within 180 days of the enactment of the 
impugned Perda—and so that Court could have refused to accept the application for 
hearing,121 as it has done in other cases mentioned above. Also, the Perda were struck
119 Supreme Court Decision No. 20.P/HUM/2002.
120 Supreme Court Decision No. 25.P / HUM / 2008.
121 In Supreme Court Decision No. 20.P/HUM/2002, the applicants challenged Perda of Kuningan District 
No. 29 of 2001 together with Kuningan District Head Decision No. 339/ KPTS-401 -BK/ 2002 Concerning
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down for being inconsistent with a Presidential Decision, even though, as we discuss 
below, the Constitution only grants the Supreme Court jurisdiction to review laws 
below the level of statute for compliance with statutes.
These cases also appear to present scholars with material that could spark scholarly 
debate about inconsistency, the need for which we outlined above. The Perda that were 
invalidated did not contravene any express stipulation, duty, mandate, or prohibition in 
the higher-level law. Instead, the Court found that the Perda were inconsistent with the 
Presidential Decision because they purported to control goods that the regulation did 
not designate as controlled goods. In effect, the Court decided that, by regulating 
similar goods but not regulating the particular goods in question (Category A 
beverages), the higher-level law had implicitly "covered the field," thereby prohibiting 
lower-level laws from further regulating Group A beverages. In this way, the Court 
found that the Perda "added to" and "modified the substance of the principal 
regulation."122
However, the case did not address important issues, two of which we mention here. 
First, the Court did not, in its published reasons, address the possibility that the 
Presidential Decision and the Perda were not, in fact, inconsistent. In our view, the 
Court could have construed the Presidential Decision as purporting to regulate the 
distribution and sale of only Category B and C beverages. Given that the Presidential 
Decision did not classify Category A beverages as "controlled goods" and, therefore, 
did not seek to regulate them in Article 3, the Decision could be interpreted as leaving 
them "open" and, therefore, subject to regulation by a local government. In other 
words, because the Presidential Decision did not regulate the distribution or sale of 
Category A beverages, the path is clear for local governments to do so.
The second issue relates to the Court's invalidation of the Perda for adding to or 
modifying the Presidential Decision. Article 136(3) of the 2004 Regional Governance 
Law states that "Perda are to expand upon higher-level law by taking into account the 
unique features of the region." Unless the higher-level law explicitly provides 
discretion to local governments, it is difficult to see how adapting prescriptions of 
higher-level laws to unique local circumstances can be achieved without modifying, 
adding to, or at least stretching that higher-level law. The Supreme Court provided no 
guidance on this point and, therefore, quite apart from the limited "precedential" value 
of Supreme Court decisions, its future approaches to this issue remain unclear.
the Establishment of a Team for the Supervision and Regulation of the Distribution of Alcohol. The Perda 
was enacted on December 19, 2001, and the application, which was dated August 27, 2002, was registered 
at the Supreme Court on September 20, 2002. This would have ordinarily put the application outside the 
180-day time period. However, the Court held that the Perda had only become "effective" since the 
promulgation of the Kuningan District Head Decision establishing the supervision team, issued on July 12, 
2002. The Court, therefore, counted the relevant time period as from July 12, 2002, to August 27, 2002 
(when the application was first made, but before it was registered). Perda of Jambi City No. 3 of 2008, 
which was the subject of Supreme Court Decision No. 25.P/HUM/2008, was enacted on March 4, 2008. 
The application was registered at the Supreme Court on September 2, 2008. That is 182 days after the 
enactment of the challenged instrument. However, the Court held, without further explanation, that this 
was within the 180-day time period. The application was dated August 25, 2008—175 days after the 
enactment of the Perda—and perhaps this influenced the Court in allowing the application.
122 See Supreme Court Decision No. 05.P / HUM / 2005 at p. 23.
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These two cases appeared likely to inspire a raft of similar challenges. Many local 
governments have sought to restrict the production, distribution, sale, and 
consumption of alcohol in very similar terms to those of the Perda partially invalidated 
in these two cases.123 So far as they purported to restrict the sale and consumption of 
Category A beverages, they were presumably susceptible to Supreme Court 
invalidation on the same basis. Judicial review of these Perda may previously have 
been blocked by the 180-day rule, but, as mentioned, the Supreme Court has abolished 
this rule.
In a recent case, however, the Supreme Court has invalidated the very Presidential 
Decision (No. 3 of 1997) that it had found the Kuningan and Jambi Perda to violate.124 
At the time of writing, the Court's decision had not yet been published on the Court's 
website. But as reported in the media, the Court's reason for finding the Presidential 
Decision invalid was that many of the higher level laws from which it purported to 
draw its authority—including an old 1971 Regional Governance Law—had been 
replaced.12'This left the Presidential Decision itself without higher legal authority, 
rendering it invalid.
There is nothing to stop regional governments from re-enacting their Perda to 
prohibit the production, distribution, sale, and consumption of Category A alcoholic 
beverages, however. Indeed, the MOHA appears to accept that some regional 
governments might now even prohibit the sale and consumption of alcoholic 
beverages altogether. In response to the Supreme Court's decision, the Home Affairs 
Minister simply expressed his hope that regional governments regulate alcohol "very 
wisely" so as "not to damage social life."126 In the meantime, the minister has proposed 
that a national Bill on Alcohol be prepared,127 which could formally override these 
prohibition Perda.
Part IV: The Future of Judicial Review in Indonesia
During our research, some legal commentators and government officials suggested 
that the Constitutional Court take over all judicial review cases. The Constitutional 
Court has been hearing constitutional review cases for almost a decade and, during the 
tenure of its first two chief justices, Jimly Asshiddiqie and Mahfud MD, it built a strong 
reputation for professionalism and has developed significant bodies of jurisprudence. 
However, the reputation of the Court plummeted in late 2013, when its third chief 
justice, Akil Mochtar, was arrested for allegedly taking bribes to fix the outcome of 
electoral disputes heard before the Court. Even though there have been few, if any, 
allegations of impropriety in the Constitutional Court's handling of judicial review
123 See, for example, Perda of Maros District No. 9 of 2001; Perda of Tangerang City No. 7 of 2005; Perda of 
Indramayu District No. 7 of 2005 (as amended by Perda of Indramayu District No. 15 of 2006); Perda of 
Banjarmasin City No. 6 of 2010; Perda of Jambi City No. 7 of 2010; Perda of Bandung City No. 11 of 2010.
124 Supreme Court Decision No. 42.P/HUM/2012. The application was lodged by the Islamic Defenders 
Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) on October 10, 2012, and decided on June 18, 2013, by H. Yulius, Dr. HM. 
Flary Djatmiko and Dr. H. Supandi.
125 "Inilah Alasan MA Batalkan Keppres Miras," Hukumottlitte, July 10, 2013.
126 Wahyu Wening, "Kepres Dicabut MA, Mendagri Usui Perlunya UU Miras," Jurnal Nasional, July 8, 2013.
127 Ibid.
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cases (the types of public law cases that we have discussed in this article, except with a 
focus on the Supreme Court), whether the Court can regain its reputation for 
professional decision making remains to be seen.
In any event, at present, its constitutionally mandated function is quite narrow. It 
can only review statutes (laws enacted by Indonesia's national parliament) to 
determine if they accord with the Constitution.128 This means that a constitutional 
amendment would probably be required to grant the Constitutional Court authority to 
review regional bylaws for compliance with higher-level laws. Amending the 
Constitution in Indonesia is, like in many other countries, a highly fraught political 
process that is likely to take years, if it occurs at all. However, we argue that the 
Constitutional Court has at its disposal at least two avenues through which it could, 
without exceeding its constitutional mandate, review bylaws, albeit only for 
compliance with the Constitution, as opposed to other "higher" laws, such as 
regulations and statutes.
First, in recent cases, the Court has sought to assess the constitutionality of not only 
the substance of statutes, but also their implementation.129 Following these cases, the 
Court could, if requested in a future case, assess the constitutionality of the 
implementation of the 2004 Regional Governance Law—which requires that bylaws 
meet various requirements, including compliance with higher-level laws and the 
public interest. The Court has, in several cases, applied Article 28D(1) of the 
Constitution ("Every person has the right to legal recognition, guarantees, protection, 
and certainty that is just, and to equal treatment before the law") to find that statutes 
that are ambiguous or inconsistent with other laws are unconstitutional.130 Using this 
ground to assess the implementation of the 2004 Regional Governance Law, the Court 
might be able to declare that a Perda which is inconsistent with a national higher-level 
law is constitutionality invalid on grounds of legal uncertainty.
Second, the Constitutional Court could arguably employ its constitutional power to 
"resolve jurisdictional disputes between state institutions whose powers are granted 
by the Constitution" (Article 24C(1) of the Constitution) to allow it to review bylaws 
against higher laws. The Court has, thus far, heard very few of these jurisdictional 
disputes. Constitutional Court Regulation 08/PMK/2006 on Guidelines for 
Constitutional State Institution Jurisdiction Dispute Proceedings provides a list of 
institutions that can bring these types of cases before the Court. They include the 
national parliament, the president, and local governments (Article 2) that consider 
their constitutional jurisdiction131 to have been "taken, reduced, impeded, ignored 
and/or damaged by another state institution" (Article 3(1)). It is at least arguable that, 
when a local government issues a bylaw that contravenes a law issued by the national 
parliament or the executive, which the president heads, such a jurisdictional dispute
128 Article 24C of the Constitution.
129 See, for example, Constitutional Court Decision No 5/PUU-IX/2011.
130 Butt and Lindsey, The Indonesian Constitution: ,4 Contextual Analysis.
131 Constitutional Court Regulation No 08/PMK/2006 stipulates in Art 1(6) that an institution's 
"constitutional jurisdiction" is its "jurisdiction that can take the form of a power/right and a 
task/ obligation which is given by the Constitution."
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occurs.132 Similarly, a jurisdictional dispute arguably occurs when the president 
purports to invalidate a bylaw issued by a regional government.
The main impediment to the Constitutional Court using this jurisdiction to review 
bylaws appears to be as follows. While the Constitution establishes national and local 
governments and, in broad terms, their powers,133 the details of the relative jurisdiction 
of national and regional governments are delineated in the 2004 Regional Governance 
Law. On the other hand, the Constitution does specify that the jurisdictions of various 
government institutions can be further regulated by statute. The question becomes 
whether this constitutional delegation is sufficient to enliven this aspect of the 
Constitutional Court's jurisdiction. To our knowledge, this argument has not yet been 
put to the Court. A significant limitation, though, is that only state institutions—and 
not aggrieved citizens—can avail themselves of this jurisdiction.
Though it might be able to review questionable Perda through these two avenues, 
in fact, the Constitutional Court has very little incentive to encumber itself with this 
burden. The Court already performs the critical functions of reviewing the 
constitutionality of statutes and resolving electoral disputes,134 responsibilities that take 
up most of the time of the Court's nine judges. Assuming responsibility for reviewing 
Perda might overwhelm it, perhaps leading to a reduction in quality of its decision 
making in these other categories of cases.
In the foreseeable future, then, it is highly likely that the Supreme Court will 
continue to handle these review cases. We argue that the Court could empower itself to 
mediate more effectively legal disputes between tiers and institutions of government. It 
could begin doing this by addressing the weaknesses we identified with the way it 
currently exercises judicial review. This would require the Court to recognize the 
fundamental differences between judicial review cases and the other types of cases it 
hears. Unlike civil and criminal cases, for example, judicial review cases do not affect 
only the legal positions of the parties, with limited applicability to others unless the 
case develops a principle of jurisprudence, as discussed above. Injudicial review cases, 
the Supreme Court's decisions have general application. That is, if the Court decides to 
invalidate a provision of a bylaw, or an entire bylaw, then the invalidated provision or 
bylaw is no longer valid—to the benefit or detriment of all citizens to whom the bylaw 
would otherwise have applied. In addition, the Court hears civil and criminal cases 
only on appeal, relying on evidence and submissions made in lower courts as well as 
on appeal. Judicial review cases, by contrast, are heard at first and final instance by the 
Supreme Court.
First, the Supreme Court could accommodate oral submissions in judicial review 
cases, allowing the parties to respond directly to each other's arguments, and questions 
from the judges, in open court. In our view, the general public arguably has a greater 
interest in judicial review cases—in which important matters of public law are often
132 Article 1(7) of Constitutional Court Regulation No 08/PMK/2006 specifies that a dispute is a "dispute 
[perselisihan] or difference of opinion related to the implementation of jurisdiction between two or more 
state institutions."
133 See, for example, Chapter III and Article 18 of the Constitution.
134 Simon Butt, Indonesian Constitutional Court Decisions in Regional Head Electoral Disputes, CDI Policy Paper 
(Canberra: Centre for Democratic Institutions, Australian National University, 2013).
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aired and decided—than they do in other cases the Court hears (unless, of course, they 
are litigants in those other cases). The Court's decisions—whether to annul or maintain 
a law—directly affect citizens because citizens are obliged to follow the law. In our 
view, then, the public has a particular interest in hearing both the arguments made 
before the Court and the Court's response to them. Yet judicial review cases are 
decided almost entirely behind closed doors. This removes transparency from the 
process and prevents judges from testing the submissions of the parties.
Further, in most other types of cases the courts hear, oral submissions have already 
been made and witness testimony heard in the lower courts. The function of the 
Supreme Court in these cases is primarily to settle matters of law 1"—particularly to 
ensure that the lower courts have made no legal errors—since the facts and legal 
arguments of the parties have already been introduced in the lower courts.
Second, the Court should, in judicial review cases, allow itself to issue injunctions 
to prevent the application of the impugned Perda for the duration of proceedings. The 
Court should also give its decisions retrospective effect so that those affected by a 
government action performed under a Perda the Court declares invalid can be 
compensated or the injustices resulting from the improper law otherwise remedied. 
Unless it does so, local governments can issue and apply bylaws that clearly breach 
human rights or higher order laws without fear that they might be prevented from 
applying them while the Supreme Court considers the case or that they might ever be 
required to compensate for those breaches. Individual citizens, therefore, have few 
incentives to lodge judicial applications with the Court, because they themselves will 
usually get no benefits, even from a favorable decision. The best they can hope for is 
that the impugned law will not be used against other citizens in the future.
Third, the Supreme Court should also publish all of its judicial review decisions, 
since these decisions relate to public issues and are critical to the integrity of regional 
autonomy and the maintenance of Indonesia's legal order. This would not significantly 
increase the Court's administrative burden given that, as mentioned, judicial review 
cases take up only a small proportion of its workload. Increased publication might also 
assist in the development of doctrine and jurisprudence.
Many of these changes can be made with relatively minor changes to the Court's 
judicial review procedures. Most of them are regulated in Supreme Court Regulations 
(Peraturan Mahkamah Agung), Practice Notes (surat edaran), or by "custom." Changing 
or removing the practices should only require amending or revoking these instruments 
or issuing new ones. The Court can do this unilaterally. Indeed, the Court removed the 
180-day time limit for the lodgment of judicial review applications, mentioned above, 
simply by issuing a Supreme Court Regulation.
But what about the apparently impassable constitutional obstacle? As mentioned, 
the Constitution (and Article 31(1) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court itself) 
permits the Supreme Court to review only lower-level laws, including Perda, as 
opposed to statutes. In other words, according to the Constitution and the 1985 
Supreme Court Law, the Court lacks power to assess the compliance of bylaws with 
other laws on the hierarchy, such as Presidential Regulations and Government 135
135 See Article 30(1) of Law No. 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court as amended by Law No. 5 of 2004.
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Regulations, or even the Constitution, including its Bill of Rights. The Court has, in fact, 
rejected applications for judicial review of bylaws as against government regulations, 
at least partly on this ground.136
The Court's stance on this fundamental issue has been far from consistent. 
Successive regulations on judicial review procedures issued by the Supreme Court 
Chief Justice since 1993 appear to have ignored these constitutional and statutory 
restraints. The regulations have declared that Supreme Court judicial review 
applications "are to be brought against a legal instrument suspected of being 
inconsistent with a higher level legal instrument."137 Indeed, the Court has, in fact, 
struck down Perda for conflicting with government regulations and presidential 
decisions in three cases we studied.138
The result is significant uncertainty about whether the Supreme Court will confine 
itself to reviewing compliance with statutes. Yet consistency is not the only 
problematic aspect of the Court's approach. Clearly, many judges of the Supreme 
Court either simply reject that the Court's general judicial review jurisdiction is limited 
by the Constitution and the Supreme Court Law or have found a legally acceptable 
way to, in effect, circumvent the limitation. It may be, for example, that some judges 
believe that the 2004 Regional Governance Law—a statute—prohibits the enactment of 
Perda that contradict higher-level laws139 and that this includes national government, 
presidential, and ministerial regulations and decisions. A bylaw would, therefore, be 
inconsistent with the 2004 Law if it breached a "higher" law, even if that higher-level 
law were not a statute.140
Similarly, judges might reason that Article 7 of the Lawmaking Law, which 
provides that the legal force of a law is commensurate with its position on the 
hierarchy of laws, justifies its apparent circumvention of the constitutional limitation of 
its jurisdiction. As the Elucidation to this provision states, a lower-level law must not 
conflict with a higher-level law. According to at least one decision of the Supreme 
Court, lower-level laws cannot, therefore, modify the substance of a higher-level law 
and cannot add to, detract from, or insert a new stipulation.141 A Perda would, 
therefore, arguably be in conflict with Article 7 of the Lawmaking Law (a statute) if it 
were inconsistent with any law higher than Perda on the hierarchy of laws.
In our view, the problem is not necessarily whether the Court has sought to 
circumvent this restriction. Rather, it is that the Court has not, in any of the judicial 
review decisions we obtained for this research, attempted to give any legal explanation 
for circumventing the limitation on its jurisdiction, let alone a convincing one. But this 
is, as we have shown in this article, indicative of the Supreme Court's general approach 
in judicial review cases, and evidence of its reluctance to engage in any detail with the 
legal "merits" of any case, at least in its written judgment. We suspect that the Court
136 See, for example, Supreme Court Decision No. 19.P/HUM/2002.
137 Article 2(2) of Supreme Court Regulations No. 1 of 2004 and 2011; Article 3(1) of Supreme Court 
Regulation No. 1 of 1993.
138 Supreme Court Decision Nos. 01 .P/HUM/2001, 20.P/HUM/2002, and 25.P/HUM/2008.
139 2004 Regional Governance Law Art 136(4).
140 Parsons and Mietzner, "Sharia By-laws in Indonesia."
141 Supreme Court Decision No. 05.P/HUM/2005 at p. 23.
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will not function as an effective mediator between governments and institutions in 
decentralized Indonesia until it provides more clarity on fundamental issues such as 
these, or at least until Indonesian legal scholars develop more instructive doctrine on 
the theory and practice of judicial review in Indonesia. This is unfortunate because, 
after decades of authoritarian rule under which the law and its operation were 
dominated by politics and corruption, the Court appears to be missing a real 
opportunity to establish law as an effective check on the exercise of government 
power.
